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With the emergence of recent democracies, scholars engaged in a polemic debate 
about whether economic, social, and cultural rights should be included in national 
constitutions.  Because economic, social, and cultural rights appeared to require 
significant political decision-making directly related to resources and economic priorities, 
critics contended that they were non-justiciable; treating economic, social, and cultural 
rights as justiciable would infringe on the balance of power among government branches.  
This thesis argues that constitutional entrenchment of such rights is appropriate to their 
realization in the twenty-first century because other methods of recognition may not 
sufficiently address implementation problems.  Furthermore, it argues such rights are 
justiciable, using recent South African jurisprudence to illustrate a pragmatic judicial 
approach that is sensitive to the balance of power criticism.  Hence, constitutionalization 
of economic, social, and cultural rights is practically achievable in the twenty-first 
century; although judicially cognizable constitutionalization may take forms different 
from the South African experience. 
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Human beings suffer, 
they torture one another, 
they get hurt  and get hard. 
No poem or play or song 
can fully right a wrong 
inflicted and endured. 
 
The innocent in gaols 
beat on their bars together. 
A hunger-striker's father 
stands in the graveyard dumb. 
The police widow in veils 
faints at the funeral home 
 
History says, Don't hope 
on this side of the grave. 
But then, once in a lifetime 
the longed for tidal wave 
of justice can rise up, 
and hope and history rhyme. 
 
So hope for a great sea-change 
on the far side of revenge. 
Believe that a further shore 
is reachable from here. 
Believe in miracles 
and cures and healing wells . . . . 
 
– Seamus Heaney, The Cure at Troy (excerpt) 
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I. Introduction 
With the adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United 
Nations formally recognized the importance of a broad spectrum of human rights.  Not 
only did the document include ―traditional‖ civil and political rights, it also contained 
economic, social, and cultural rights.
1
  These newly recognized rights
2
 had their roots in 
the Socialist thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
3
 and the social 
reform policies of the New Deal.
4
  Yet since the Universal Declaration‘s unanimous 
adoption over sixty years ago, economic, social, and cultural rights
5
 have not enjoyed the 
                                                 
1
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 Dec. 1948) U.N. Doc. A/810. 
2
 Economic, social, and cultural human rights (as recognized in the Universal Declaration) include the right 
to social security (in accordance with the organization and resources of the nation-state), the right to 
work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to education, and 
the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, among others.  Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Articles 22–26. 
3
 University of Minnesota Human Rights Resource Center, "Circle of Rights: Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights Activism: An Historical Perspective on ESC Rights," 8 Nov. 2010 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/modules/module2.htm>. 
4
 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Four Freedoms," Franklin D. Roosevelt's Address to Congress, 6 Jan. 1941 
<http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs36b.htm>. 
5
 These rights have also been discussed using several terminologies.  International legal treaties and 
organizations divide human rights between civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural 
rights.  In addition, Karel Vasak described rights in historical terms, introducing three “generations” of 
human rights.  According to Vasak, the first generation of rights includes “negative” rights “in the sense 
that their respect requires that the state do nothing to interfere with individual liberties, and they 
correspond roughly to the civil and political rights.”  Karel Vasak, “A 30-year Struggle: The Sustained 
Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Unesco Courier 30.10 (1977): 
29.  The second generation of rights required “positive action by the state to be implemented, as is the 
case with most social, economic and cultural rights.”  Jackson v. Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. Ill. 
1983).  The third generation of rights, which Vasak called “rights of solidarity,” include the right to a 
healthy environment and the right to peace.  Jackson, 1203.  These rights are sometimes discussed as 
liberty rights (civil and political rights) and claim rights (economic, social, and cultural rights).  They are 
also divided by their “negative” or “positive” characteristics.  See also Alan Gerwirth, The Community of 
Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 33-38.  In any event, I shall refer to them by the legal 
instrument title (economic, social, and cultural rights) for the duration of the paper; although cited 
authors may refer to them using different terminology. 
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success or legitimacy of civil and political rights.  They have suffered in terms of global 
attention, advocacy, and practical implementation. 
Although nation-states have recognized economic, social, and cultural principles 
as human rights in international legal documents, western democracies have been 
reluctant to institutionalize methods for progressively achieving and monitoring those 
rights.  In this thesis, I focus on the practical implementation of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, and I argue that such principles can be recognized as justiciable rights in 
national constitutions.
6
  To understand the modern rights framework, I first analyze why 
the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights is justified, including a brief 
overview of the historical and philosophical role of rights.  Second, I argue that other 
types of recognition inadequately address implementation problems, and constitutional 
recognition provides unique advantages not present in other alternatives.  Third, I address 
a significant objection to the constitutionalization of economic, social, and cultural 
rights—whether such rights can be justiciable. 
Justiciability concerns—concerns about whether such rights can have adequate 
and appropriate remedies—are probably the greatest barrier to the practical 
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights.  A study of recent South African 
jurisprudence (specifically, the cases of the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
v. Grootboom
7
 and Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign
8
), however, 
provides a preliminary model for other countries to follow.  By analyzing this approach, I 
argue that such rights can be practically achievable through constitutionalization.  
                                                 
6
 Throughout the thesis, I use “constitution” to refer to both constitutions and (stand-alone) national bills 
of rights. 
7
 Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
8
 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
 3 
Specifically, the new South African Constitution protects several economic, social, and 
cultural rights; and its Constitutional Court has been willing to provide citizens with 
limited redressability.  Under its approach, rather than asking if the right, itself, was 
violated, the South African Constitutional Court evaluates whether government action 
was reasonable in relation to the right at issue.  This approach maintains the balance of 
powers within government, and it also provides practical value to economic, social, and 
cultural rights for individual citizens by giving them a means of redressability.   
Because the South African example demonstrates that justiciably cognizable 
constitutionalization of economic, social, and cultural rights is feasible, it provides other 
nations with a preliminary model to follow in crafting the best practical method of 
implementing these rights, thereby providing citizens with a means of redress at the 
domestic level and directing governments to prioritize these fundamental principles. 
Lastly, I note that the South African example is not the only possibility.  Rather, 
scholars should continue to consider new options and evaluate alternative 
constitutionalization schemes for progressively achieving these rights in the twenty-first 
century. 
II. Theoretical Background 
The position that economic, social, and cultural rights should be constitutionalized 
rests upon the contention that practical implementation of economic, social, and cultural 
rights principles is justified.  From a purely practical standpoint, 160 nation-states are 
parties (i.e. domestic ratification has been completed in those countries) to the 1966 
 4 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
9
  Unlike the 
Universal Declaration, which is an aspirational document, ICESCR is a binding 
multilateral treaty under which states assume specific obligations, including the 
―progressive[e] . . . realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means.‖
10
  Hence, each of those 160 nation-states has legally committed itself 
to the realization of economic, social, and cultural principles enshrined in ICESCR, and 
another 69 countries which have signed the treaty, but not yet domestically ratified it, 
have signaled their political support of its principles.  From this standpoint, parties to 
ICESCR have a legal obligation to pursue practical implementation methods of these 
principles; from a legal perspective, states have a compelling reason to pursue practical 
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
Outside of international legal concerns, the nature of human rights can help shed 
light on why economic, social, and cultural principles are moral imperatives; and 
therefore, why they should be protected in national constitutions—which enshrine some 
of the deepest values of societies.  Today, rights are generally understood as theoretical 
constructs that confer entitlements to right-holders and duties to the corresponding duty-
bearers.
11
  Duties may include obligations of non-interference (such as in the case of 
some civil and political rights), positive burdens to adequately provide certain basic 
human entitlements (such as in the case of some economic, social, and cultural rights), or 
                                                 
9
 United Nations, "Chapter IV: Human Rights" 29 Nov. 2010, United Nations Treaty Collection, 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en>. 
10
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Preamble (3 Jan. 1976), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
11
 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, ed. Walter Cook 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919) 38.   
 5 
both.  Human rights are properly considered a subset of rights, which grant particular 
entitlements to all humans based upon their humanity. 
As Louis Henkin has observed, ―international human rights are not the work of 
philosophers, but of politicians and citizens, and philosophers have only begun to try to 
build conceptual justifications for them.‖
12
  Nevertheless, rights conceptions can help 
explain why such rights are moral imperatives. 
In the 16th century, the Protestant Reformation swept Europe, creating Protestant 
denominations, separate from the Roman Catholic Church.  The Roman Catholic 
Church‘s schism allowed Europeans to exercise a measure of religious choice, and the 
division eventually helped to secularize Europe.
13
  In its 17th century aftermath, Europe 
was forced to reconcile a newly pluralistic religious society.  The fall of the Roman 
Catholic Church‘s religious monopoly and corresponding political power gave rise to 
new political concepts such as the ―divine right of kings.‖
14
  Recognizing problems posed 
by religious diversity, philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke began to 
conceptualize new political theories on the limits of state power framed in terms of 
―rights.‖
15
  Since then, rights have been understood as particular political demands 
against the state which mediate the relationship between the collective and the individual 
                                                 
12
 Philip Harvey, “Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights 
Seriously,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 33 (2002): 390–401, 390. 
13
 Steven Kreis, "Lecture 3: The Protestant Reformation," The History Guide: Lectures on Early Modern 
European History.  19 Dec. 2010 <http://www.historyguide.org/earlymod/lecture3c.html>. 
14
 Richard Hooker, "Divine Right of Kings," The European Enlightenment Glossary.  19 Dec. 2010 < 
http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/DIVRIGHT.HTM>. 
15
 Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan,” The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (London: John Bohn, 1839); John 
Locke, “The Second Treatise of Government,” The Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul: Paragon, 2001) 
72. 
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(either alone or as part of a distinct—usually minority—group).
16
  As such, these 
foundational rights recognized by a society express a society‘s core beliefs and values 
regarding the relationship between the individual and the state.
17
 
As one of the 17th century‘s central thinkers, John Locke introduced a theory of 
natural rights.  He appealed to an ―omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker‖
18
 as the creator 
―of natural equality.‖
19
  For Locke, humans are born into a pre-political ―state of nature,‖ 
where each individual enjoys ―perfect freedom.‖
20
  Individuals in this state are limited 
only by the ―law of Nature‖ which treats all humans as equal and independent.
21
  The law 
of Nature prescribes that no individual can harm the life, health, liberty, and possessions 
of any other individual,
22
 thereby giving individuals certain inalienable natural rights.
23
  
This law is equally accessible to individuals because it only can be discovered through 
reason, endowed to all humans.
24
  Because of disorder in the state of nature, humans form 
a social contract consenting to transfer their rights to governments to mutually protect 
their life, liberty, and property.
25
  Yet this transfer of power to the government is not 
                                                 
16
 Jeanne M. Woods, “Rights as Slogans: A Theory of Human Rights Based on African Humanism,” National 
Black Law Journal 17 (2002–2004): 52–66, 52. 
17
 Woods, 52. 
18
 Locke, 72–73. 
19
 Andrew Reeve, “John Locke,” Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, eds. Iain McLean and Alistair 
McMillan, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 316. 
20
 Locke, 72. 
21
 Locke, 72–73. 
22
 Locke, 72–73. 
23
 Constitutional Rights Foundation, "Natural Rights," Constitutional Rights Foundation 19 Dec. 2010 
<http://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/natural-rights.html>. 
24
 "Locke's Political Philosophy," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 29 July 2010 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/>. 
25
 Locke, 75. 
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absolute; it is recognized as valid only as long as the government uses the power to 
protect individual, natural rights.
26
  
Locke used the idea of natural rights to express ―the idea that there were certain 
moral truths that applied to all people, regardless of the particular place where they lived 
or the agreements they had made.‖
27
  This approach embraced pluralism by requiring the 
state to recognize liberty of conscience, including religious tolerance.
28
  Inherent in this 
approach is a commitment to liberty through freedom of conscience. 
In the 18th century during the Scottish Enlightenment, thinkers such as David 
Hume took a more optimistic view of human nature.  Hume embraced a natural ―moral 
sense‖ or ―sentiment‖ which was ―more properly felt than judg'd‖ as the core of 
morality.
29
  As the Enlightenment spread across Europe to America, humanitarianism 
would become one of its trademarks.
30
  The Enlightenment expanded upon the 
importance of freedom of conscience inherent in Locke‘s philosophy.  The 
Enlightenment view held that if humans were free to exercise their reason, they would 
naturally act with respect to the welfare of others, for they were essentially moral, 
rational beings.
31
  Furthermore, they had unique inherent qualities and abilities.
32
  
                                                 
26
 Patrick Hayden, The Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul: Paragon, 2001) 71. 
27
 "Locke's Political Philosophy," <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/>. 
28
 See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Huddersfield: J. Brook, 1796).  This religious tolerance 
did not extend to atheists (who would not swear legally binding oaths) and Catholics (who were loyal to a 
foreign power).  Jim Powell, "John Locke Natural Rights to Life, Liberty and Property," The Freeman: Ideas 
on Liberty,20 Dec 2010 <http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/john-locke-natural-rights-to-life-
liberty-and-property/>.   
29
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888) 
470. 
30
 Hackett Lewis, "The Age of Enlightenment," International World History Project 20 Dec. 2010 
<http://history-world.org/age_of_enlightenment.htm>. 
31
 Lewis, <http://history-world.org/age_of_enlightenment.htm>. 
32
 Paul Gingrich, “Notes on the Enlightenment and Liberalism,” University of Regina Department of 
Sociology and Social Studies 20 Dec. 2010 <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/en318f02.htm>. 
 8 
Accordingly, moral conduct ―required freedom from needless restraints.‖
33
  Because 
one‘s humanness relies on one‘s moral sense and rational thought (which, in turn, 
requires autonomy and intrinsic freedom), a core measure of liberty is essential for its 
realization.  Conversely, without liberty and autonomy, rational beings could not flourish; 
therefore state power must be limited to ensure freedom for individuals to thrive and 
realize their humanness.  This fundamental optimism concerning human nature was 
reflected in the thought of Americans Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, 
and George Mason,
34
 and consequently in the United States‘ founding documents and its 
Bill of Rights.
35
 
In the 19th century, Karl Marx and other socialist thinkers would contemplate 
how capitalism economically and socially exploited wage laborers to create profit.  Marx 
would argue that capitalism created a segmented society marked by vast inequalities of 
wealth and power, where the working class experienced oppressive working and social 
conditions.
36
  Natural rights had focused on restricting government power, but these types 
of rights were insufficient to ―achiev[e] positive human emancipation‖ from the problems 
of capitalism.
37
  These ideas were also reflected in the United States in both the 
Progressive Era and the New Deal social welfare policies that were designed to address 
the inequities and unfairness of industrial capitalism.
38
  Because of the thinking of Marx 
and other socialists, the list of rights expanded ―well beyond those proposed by the early 
                                                 
33
 Lewis, <http://history-world.org/age_of_enlightenment.htm>. 
34
 E.g. Charles B. Sanford, The Religious Life of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 1984) 20–21. 
35
 See U.S. Constitution; see also U.S. Declaration of Independence. 
36
 Patrick Hayden, “Karl Marx,” The Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul: Paragon, 2001) 126. 
37
 Hayden, 126–127. 
38
 "Social Legislation," Gale Encylopedia of US History, 20 Dec. 2010 
<http://www.answers.com/topic/social-legislation>. 
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social contact theorists.‖
39
  Because the abuse of power by private, economic entities 
could be as dangerous as the state‘s abuse of power, this line of thought found historical 
civil and political rights were insufficient because they only limited state action.  Rather 
than merely restricting government action, the government also had to proactively protect 
individuals from the perils inherent in capitalism. 
Trends in rights thought would change significant with the rise of the social 
sciences; contemporary philosophers would reject a hallmark idea of the 
Enlightenment—that the moral sense inherent in all individuals could reveal moral truth 
through free and open discussion.
40
  Rather, 19th and 20th century philosophers 
increasingly recognized that humans were socially constructed.
41
  Because contemporary 
philosophy views individuals as historical and social constructs, there is no longer 
agreement about human nature and the natural, moral sense.  This  broke ―the link 
between truth and justifiability.‖
42
 
Modern philosophers have dealt with this lack of objective moral foundation in 
various ways.  For instance, among important contemporary philosophers, John Rawls 
accepts that ―as a practical political matter no general moral conception can provide the 
basis for a public conception of justice in a modern democratic society.‖
43
  Rather than 
searching for an objective moral foundation, he believes a liberal democracy may thrive 
                                                 
39
 Hayden, 127. 
40
 Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom 
eds. Merrill D. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 258. 
41
 Rorty, 258. 
42
 Rorty, 258. 
43
 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 
225. 
 10 
using an ―overlapping consensus.‖
44
  This avoids disagreements regarding religion and 
philosophy by forming a consensus among diverse citizens on a core of commitments.  
Thus, Rawls believes, pluralistic societies can find pragmatic solutions to disagreements; 
rather than arguing about justifications, the justification simply becomes the consensus.  
Under this view, rights become instrumentally important for a multitude of reasons. 
In the same manner that Rawls discussed, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights 
served as a signal that the international community had agreed pragmatically that 
economic, social, and cultural rights were important.  Under the contemporary view, a 
shared objective foundation is unnecessary; the Universal Declaration signifies a 
consensus that diverse people, regardless of their moral commitments and their social 
construction, could agree that economic, social, and cultural rights were important 
enough, normatively, to be designated as core political commitments. 
Finally, in addition to pragmatic justifications, the concurrent realization of civil 
and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights is crucial to the functional 
fulfillment of both types of rights because they are fundamentally interdependent. From 
the time of the Universal Declaration, both types of human rights have been recognized 
by the international community as interrelated and interdependent.  Sandra Fredman 
notes: 
  
                                                 
44
 Rawls, 225–226. 
 11 
Without basic socio-economic entitlements, civil and political rights cannot be 
fully exercised.  Freedom of speech or assembly are of little use to a starving or 
homeless person.  Equally problematically, those without resources will find it 
hard to access the legal system to redress breaches of their rights . . . . The 
interaction also works in the other direction . . . . As Sen has argued . . . . 
[f]reedom of the press, a free opposition, and freedom of information ‗spread the 
penalty of famine to the ruling groups.‘
45
 
In effect, civil and political rights have little practical meaning without the support of 
basic economic, social, and cultural rights.  The realization of economic, social, and 
cultural rights affects the realization of civil and political rights, and this makes them 
instrumentally valuable in attaining civil and political rights, and the reverse is also true.  
Promoting one type of right can enhance and promote the other type.  Because civil and 
political rights are intimately tied to the enjoyment of social, economic, and cultural 
rights (and vice versa), the concurrent realization of both types of rights is important. 
Although this thesis is not designed to defend a particular theoretical view of 
rights because it focuses on the normative function of economic, social, and cultural 
rights, it is based upon the premise that such rights are imperatives because 1) they are 
international legal commitments; 2) the international community has pragmatically 
agreed that they are moral imperatives; and 3) they are instrumentally important for the 
fulfillment of civil and political rights.  Thus, finding achievable methods of practical 
realization is important for all governments. 
II. Forms of Recognition 
There are many modes of recognizing economic, social, and, cultural rights.  This 
section examines strategies for recognizing economic, social, and cultural rights.  It 
                                                 
45
 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 67. 
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argues that although strategies which do not involve constitutionalization may provide 
certain practical benefits, they insufficiently address problems with the implementation of 
such rights.  In effect, full realization of these rights may include other means of practical 
recognition, but justiciable constitutionalization can effectively address many practical 
concerns.  Constitutionalization is an important method of practical implementation.  
Although these other means of recognition can fill in some of the gaps not addressed by 
constitutionalization, they cannot fully replace the constitutionalization of economic, 
social, and cultural rights.  
a. Informal Recognition 
Recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights may be either informal (non-
legal) or formal (legal).  Informal recognition includes work encompassed by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and advocates, in both domestic and international 
contexts.  Even though such work is necessary to the realization of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, it is not satisfactory.  Informal actors intervene only when local, state, 
national, and international governments are unable or unwilling to provide basic 
economic, social, and cultural rights.  As such, they are temporary ―fixes‖ to 
governmental inaction. 
Informal recognition includes many drawbacks when used as an exclusive 
strategy to address economic, social, and cultural rights.  Informal actors are often solely 
funded through private donations; consequently, their resources are far more limited than 
government entities.  Moreover, they may support specific agendas, antithetical to the 
diversity of liberal democracies, or favor specific groups, limiting equal access to 
resources.  Hence, informal recognition does not ensure equal fulfillment of economic, 
 13 
social, and cultural rights nor does it guarantee such rights at all; it merely helps address 
some temporary economic, social, and cultural concerns. 
In this situation, informal recognition does not help establish the primacy of such 
rights because it is informal; in the next section I will argue that only formal legal 
recognition can help re-order societal values, establishing the primacy and urgency of 
economic, social, and cultural rights and helping ensure the necessary foundation for the 
concurrent realization of civil and political rights.  Furthermore, formal legal recognition 
prioritizes these rights as legitimate government concerns. 
b. Formal Recognition 
i. International Recognition 
 Formal recognition can happen on both the international and domestic levels.  As 
pointed out in the introduction, economic, social, and cultural rights have already gained 
international recognition.  Such rights were first recognized as global aspirations in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the United Nations on 
December 10, 1948.
46
  Eighteen years later, the United Nations adopted two treaties to 
implement the various aspects of the Universal Declaration—the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
47
  Since then, there have been numerous 
international treaties dealing with different aspects of economic, social, and cultural 
rights.  Yet, as discussed below, international recognition is insufficient for two reasons: 
                                                 
46
 There were, however, eight abstentions.  Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, 2nd ed. 
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) 22. 
47
 Paul G. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2003)  244. 
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first, international implementation for all rights is relatively weak; second, international 
recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights is even weaker than international 
recognition of civil and political rights. 
 International recognition is important because it helps emphasize the universal 
nature of such rights across cultures, and it provides states with legal commitments to 
pursue them.  Furthermore, it enables states to use the weight of international consensus 
as a political argument to pressure other states into specific practices.  Thus, international 
recognition works for the realization of rights in key ways.   
However, although traditional international legal structures can provide some 
remedies, such as international condemnation against rights violators, in many cases, it 
cannot adequately rectify internal human rights violations—this is true for both civil and 
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights.  Regrettably, international 
bodies are notoriously weak enforcement entities, and the principle of state sovereignty 
often protects violator states.  For instance, the United Nations Assembly defined South 
Africa's program of apartheid as a danger to international peace and security in a 
resolution in 1961.
48
  In 1985, the Security Council urged members to participate in 
sports and cultural embargoes, suspend loans, prohibit certain trade with South Africa, 
and suspend new investment.
49
  Yet apartheid did not formally end until 1994, largely as 
a result of both internal and external pressure.  Because sovereignty often dominates 
international relations, states may claim reservations to international treaties, refuse to 
                                                 
48
 "The UN and Apartheid: A Chronology," UN Chronicle, 1 Sept. 1994, United Nations Publications, 
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acknowledge the authority of international monitoring bodies, or assert exemptions based 
on emergency circumstances. 
Even where there is international implementation of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, it has been much weaker and less effective than the international 
implementation of civil and political rights.  For instance, the implementation structure of 
ICCPR (which protects civil and political rights) provided for the creation of the Human 
Rights Committee, an independent U.N. body which oversees a reporting procedure.
50
  
ICESCR (which protects economic, social, and cultural rights), on the other hand, 
originally provided for implementation by the United Nations‘ Economic and Social 
Council.
51
  Hence, although ICCPR was overseen by an independent body, ICESCR was 
overseen by a political body of the United Nations.
52
  The importance of an independent 
review body cannot be over-emphasized.  Independent bodies have the freedom to 
criticize violator practices, regardless of which state is doing the violating, the nature of 
the violations, or the political ramifications of such criticism.  Political bodies, on the 
other hand, are constrained by government policies and political agendas.  An 
independent body has the duty to report fairly and accurately on violations, whenever and 
wherever they occur, but political bodies are made of political actors constrained by their 
national interests.  Such political interests are often at odds with reporting on states‘ 
internal violations, and politics may preclude state actors from reporting on violations of 
other states.  Because of these considerations, political bodies are unsuited to the role of a 
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transparent review body.  Transparency requires independence, and politically 
constrained bodies simply are not independent because they are harnessed to politics.
53
 
Furthermore, ICCPR‘s implementation structure provides for reporting 
procedures and inter-state grievance petitions,
54
 but ICESCR only provides for a 
reporting procedure.
55
  Because ICESCR does not provide for an inter-state grievance 
process, it is much weaker than ICCPR.  Reporting procedures are content-neutral 
procedural requirements.  In effect, ICESCR mandates a procedure—periodic 
reporting—but does not review substantive content for violations.  The procedural 
requirement of progress reports does not mandate any specific progressive realization of 
economic, social, and cultural rights, nor does it address new violations by states.  If such 
a progress report read ―not applicable‖ or ―no progress,‖ there is little the Economic and 
Social Council can do because only the report itself is required under the Covenant.   
On the other hand, ICCPR allows an inter-state grievance procedure.  This 
enables the Human Rights Committee to review whether the substantive actions of a state 
are in accord with the covenant.  Unfortunately, only states can bring civil and political 
complaints before the Human Rights Committee, which relegates even these grievances 
to the political process.  However, although ICCPR‘s implementation procedures could 
also be stronger, at least its supervisory body can review substantive violations in some 
capacity.   
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This dualistic approach to these two types of rights, which allows a means of 
substantive redressability for political and civil rights but which relegates economic, 
social, and cultural rights entirely to the political realm, treats civil and political rights as 
justiciable and economic, social, and cultural rights as merely aspirational.
56
  The idea of 
justiciability is a complex one, and the next section will discuss it in more detail.  Laying 
aside a detailed discussion of justiciability for the moment, the discrepancies between 
ICESCR and ICCPR allow a generalized means of redressability on the nation-state level 
for civil and political rights; but economic, social, and cultural rights rely solely on a 
reporting procedure.   
Even noting the disparity between ICESCR and ICCPR, neither covenant 
adequately rectifies internal human rights violations of nation-states on the international 
level; both covenants could go farther in protecting such rights.  Neither covenant 
currently allows individuals or non governmental entities to report substantive violations.  
Thus, there is no apparatus to review substantive violations without the political support 
of a state, which can report it on behalf of a body or individual, subject to its political 
will.  Even if the covenants did allow individuals to report significant violations, 
however, state sovereignty significantly curtails any means of redressability beyond 
international condemnation.  Although international condemnation can be a useful tool, it 
cannot adequately address rights violations in many circumstances.  This is true of all 
rights, both civil and political rights
57
 and economic, social, and cultural rights. 
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In short, international enforcement efforts of economic, social, and cultural rights 
have failed to secure such rights for global citizens.  In the future, even if there will be an 
enforceable international instrument
58
 to help address violations of such rights, it will still 
be subject to domestic remedy processes.  Although international enforcement efforts 
remain important, they are not sufficient for the practical implementation of economic, 
social, and cultural rights.  Because most international instruments require domestic 
remedies to be exhausted before an international claim can be made, addressing human 
rights at a domestic level is the quickest route to redress for individuals, and it is 
undoubtedly the most effective method of enforcing these rights.  
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ii. Domestic Recognition 
Even though international implementation is crucial, domestic implementation is 
more effective for individuals whose rights have been violated.  As Claire Archbold 
notes, ―a human rights culture will only really be created in a particular society if human 
rights are incorporated into its national law.‖
59
  Domestic implementation is critical to the 
progressive realization of economic, social, and cultural rights because only governments 
have the national structure, resources, and power to help realize such rights.  Eric Posner 
has noted that ―law without government exists at the international level, law normally 
requires courts to interpret and enforce it, effective courts cannot exist without supporting 
government institutions, no such institutions exist at the international level.  In the 
absence of effective international courts, the next best thing is the domestic court, which 
can at least apply the law and enforce it—and maybe advance it.‖
60
  
In addition, unlike international protection, domestic protection can proactively 
protect and fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights.  Constitutional provisions and 
statutory implementation can ensure positive action toward fulfilling such rights.  
Furthermore, unlike international apparatuses that are subject to extensive bureaucracy, 
the protective shroud of national sovereignty, and few substantial remedies, domestic 
protection can offer efficient and (comparatively) timely remedies for individuals whose 
rights have been violated. 
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There are two main types of domestic solution:  first, through adoption into 
ordinary law (statutes); or second, through national constitutions.  I argue below that even 
though statutory protection can be an effective method of ensuring economic, social, and 
cultural rights, this is not the best method.  Rather, express constitutional provisions offer 
a much better fit for economic, social, and cultural rights because it does not subject them 
to political whims.  It enshrines such rights as broad principles which can be shaped to a 
variety of circumstances; it properly counterbalances the autonomous side of human 
nature as conceived in civil and political rights; it serves to awaken national human rights 
consciousness; and it can provide a method of redress for citizens. 
1. Statutory Protection 
Statutory protection is relatively easily implemented by states and can adequately 
ensure proactive protection of rights.  However, the ease of enacting ordinary law is also 
its drawback—for it is just as easily changed and modified.
61
  Ordinary law is subject to 
political whims and changing political majorities.  Those who lack the most basic 
economic, social, and cultural concerns usually also lack political power.
62
  Conversely, 
those who have political power may lack the urgent need to address economic, social, and 
cultural rights.  Implementation of rights in ordinary law is entirely subject to political 
will which may be entirely lacking.  This is contrary to the notion of a human right; for 
rights should not be dependent on political will for their realization.  Politically enacted 
privileges, such as tax cuts, can freely be given or taken away by political majorities in 
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response to current economics, politics, customs, or other societal concerns.  Because 
human rights, as I have defined them above, are moral entitlements based on an 
agreement, they should not be subject to such political trends.  Thus, there is a marked 
difference between politically enacted privileges and human rights, where the latter 
requires firmer establishment. 
There is also a marked difference between statutory implementation and 
constitutional implementation in terms of the language of the right.  Constitutions 
enshrine broad principles whereas statutes address particular problems.  Writer James 
McClellan notes that a ―constitution should be concerned with first principles of 
government; it should not be an endeavor to provide rules of administration for a 
multitude of concerns.
63
  Constitutions are meant to protect generally applicable 
principles which allow the branches of government the necessary leeway to interpret 
those principles in view of particular situations.  Thus, constitutions enshrine ―thin‖ or 
universally applicable principles, which allows the branches of government to ―thicken‖ 
or contour the constitutional principles to particular situations.  Statutory implementation, 
on the other hand, is already ―thickened‖ through the political process.  Ordinary laws 
have already been contoured to the political and economic atmosphere at the time.  In this 
sense, ordinary law is reactionary; it lags behind changing situations, whereas 
constitutional recognition fully encompasses the right by defining it in broad language.  
Statutory implementation, therefore, can be subject to reactionary gaps where aspects of 
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the right are not, in fact, protected.  In such an instance, an individual has no opportunity 
for redress and instead falls prey to a gap created by changing circumstances. 
Lastly, with regard to statutory legislation, there is a disconnect in the approach of 
many western countries, which relegate economic, social, and cultural rights entirely to 
ordinary law while protecting civil and political rights in their constitutions.  This 
approach treats economic, social, and cultural rights as second-class rights, yet rights (of 
any kind) have ―never been fully achievable in the absence of laws which do establish 
them as constitutional rights available to individual citizens.‖
64
  For all of these reasons, 
economic, social, and cultural rights should be enshrined as constitutional provisions. 
2. Constitutional Recognition 
a. Aspirational Recognition 
 Within constitutional documents, there are two types of cognizable recognition—
aspirational (partial) recognition and justiciable (full) recognition.  Constitutions may 
distinguish between principles that are purely aspirational and those which are 
redressable through judicial action.  Some countries, such as India and Ireland, have 
chosen to treat economic, social, and cultural rights as purely directive principles for 
political action.
65
  Even in this capacity, such recognition is important, because it may 
help shape government priorities.  However, if political majorities completely disregard 
aspirational principles, there is no recourse against the government or the state, other than 
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democratically changing the majority through elections.  Although partial constitutional 
recognition is better than simply disregarding economic, social, and cultural rights, it is 
relatively ineffective method for the practical realization of such rights. 
Whether principles in constitutions are fully or partially recognized, they can play 
a pivotal role in national consciousness, and their provisions can generate significant 
public endorsement.  In other words, constitutional recognition has ―myth-making 
potential.‖
66
  In this capacity, they can help build a national human rights consciousness.  
They can serve as guiding principles which help awaken human rights consciousness 
within the nation.  They also may serve as educational tools, instilling the importance of 
foundational ethical principles in all citizens.  Used in this way, the memorialization of 
human rights in constitutional documents helps cement the importance of protecting 
rights and fosters greater human rights awareness and sensitivity.  People value principles 
enshrined in their constitution, and they talk about their constitutional rights with a deep 
gravity.  Principles enshrined in a constitution can form ―a statement of how a country 
imagines itself.‖
67
  This statement can and should include recognition of the foundational 
principles of human nature, both the human need for liberty and autonomy and human 
social obligations.  However, without full recognition, people may be more ambivalent 
about constitutional principles.  As stated at the beginning of the thesis, rights are 
entitlements that have corresponding duties, but when duties become optional, they are 
no longer properly considered ―duties;‖ therefore economic, social, and cultural rights are 
reduced to mere guiding principles, rather than rights.  Certainly, there seems to be a 
marked difference in the gravity with which individuals might talk about their ―right to 
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free speech‖ (a justiciable right in the U.S. Constitution) as opposed to ―ensuring 
domestic tranquility‖ (part of the aspirational preamble of the U.S. Constitution).  Even 
though both may have some myth-making value, the redressability of the former lends it 
credence and weight lacking from the latter.  In other words, fully recognized rights can 
serve as educational tools and help build human rights consciousness, like aspirational 
goals, but fully recognized rights are more effective as educational tools and 
consciousness-builders because they are taken more seriously on account of their 
redressability.  Although enshrining economic, social, and cultural rights in constitutions 
can serve important purposes even without enforcement mechanisms, this approach does 
not realize their potential because it robs such rights of their gravity. 
 As French jurist Karel Vasak noted, many economic, social, and cultural rights 
―can only be implemented by the combined efforts of everyone: individuals, states and 
other bodies, as well as public and private institutions.‖
68
  Although all of the methods of 
recognition discussed in this section are desirable on some level, none of them can 
adequately protect economic, social, and cultural rights without full constitutional 
protection.  Informal recognition only serves as a reactionary—and often imbalanced—
response to the gravest violations (such as a lack of food in emergency situations).  
Formal recognition on the international level has failed to secure these rights because of a 
lack of political willpower to make them priorities and because of the very structure of 
the nation-state system, which protects countries from interference in their domestic 
activities through the idea of national sovereignty.  Partial recognition on the domestic 
level which deprives economic, social, and cultural principles of the status of a ―right‖ by 
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making duties optional fails to protect them adequately and fails to maximize their human 
rights consciousness-building potential.  Thus, the real success of these rights lies in full 
constitutional recognition and implementation. 
III. Justiciable Constitutional Recognition 
In the preceding sections, I discussed why other methods of implementation are 
not adequate alternatives to the constitutionalization of economic, social, and cultural 
rights.  As noted in the previous section, there are excellent reasons to memorialize 
economic, social, and cultural rights in constitutions apart from their justiciability.  As 
guiding principles which can awaken human rights consciousness, they can serve 
important purposes even without enforcement mechanisms.  This approach nonetheless 
does not realize the promise of equalizing economic, social, and cultural rights with 
political and civil rights.  Full justiciable constitutionalization
69
 provides the most 
effective method for ensuring such rights because it addresses a critical need for 
implementation at the domestic level.  Constitutional rights are much more difficult to 
change than ordinary legislation, so they are not liable to political trends.  They serve 
both as principles which build human rights consciousness in a nation as well as—
importantly—rights able to be judicially protected, thereby giving such rights functional 
meaning to individuals.   
This type of constitutional recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights 
acknowledges that such rights impose real world obligations on all members of the 
human race.  These real world obligations are important because they stabilize the 
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community and provide a network of basic support which ensures that individuals have 
the freedom to realize the autonomous part of their nature.  Furthermore, they provide an 
aspirational and an actionable framework, balancing both human freedom and human 
duties to others. 
The justiciable entrenchment of economic, social, and cultural rights is also 
important because courts are charged with upholding the rule of law, including equality, 
fairness, and justice.  They ground their decisions in constitutional principles because the 
constitution represents a social compact between citizens on which government is 
founded.  Placing economic, social, and cultural rights in constitutions directs all 
branches of the government—including courts—to weigh the values inherent in these 
rights when applying the law to particular situations.  By constitutionalizing them, society 
directs courts to take these rights into account when balancing other needs of the 
community. 
Lastly, judicial protection of economic, social, and cultural rights is critical 
because it gives individuals a remedy when the government fails to honor those rights.  
As the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations commented, ―[i]n relation to 
civil and political rights, it is generally taken for granted that judicial remedies for 
violations are essential.  Regrettably, the contrary assumption is made in relation to 
economic, social, and cultural rights.‖
70
  Enforcement gives effect to rights, and it ensures 
their adherence by governments.  Because the public-at-large has a means of 
redressability. the government is forced to prioritize economic, social, and cultural rights, 
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and citizens have a method of realizing these rights when the government does not live 
up to its responsibility.  Rights require corresponding duties and obligations; otherwise, 
they are mere goals.  Without adequate redressability, these rights lose their practical 
value for individuals in the real world.   
Yet, as the Economist noted in 2001, ―[u]p to now Western human-rights 
campaigners have left economic and social concerns to humanitarians and 
philanthropists. When they have taken an interest in economic and social conditions, it 
has been merely to strengthen the case for political crusading.‖
71
  So why have these 
types of rights eluded practical implementation?  In part, they fell victim to political 
realities and historical circumstances of the twentieth century.  These rights also differed 
in significant ways from the more traditional civil and political rights, and these 
differences created great practical challenges.  For instance, economic, social, and 
cultural rights may require significant economic investment for their realization.  Indeed, 
some objectors note, a resource-scarce country may have to ignore some rights as a 
matter of economic necessity.
72
   
Those who recognize the value of economic, social, and cultural rights yet who 
still protest constitutionalization do so for one overarching reason: they believe the liberal 
political state‘s judicial branch is not designed to protect rights which appear to require 
significant political decision-making, as this would infringe on the balance of powers 
among government branches.  To enforce such rights and provide adequate remedies, 
critics argue, judiciaries would be forced to make political decisions, such as how to 
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allocate scarce resources between ideological goods.  If the judiciary encroaches on 
legislative power by making political decisions, it threatens to upset the balance of power 
among government branches.  Because modern governance models rely on the balance of 
power among branches, the separation of power is vital to the harmony of the entire 
governmental system.  In effect, opponents of constitutionalization argue that if courts 
have the power to offer means of redressability concerning economic, social, and cultural 
rights, they will have an ―an overriding veto power‖ against the legislative branch.
73
  
Indeed, even when such rights have been constitutionalized, ―courts have generally been 
unwilling to get into social policy.‖
74
  For instance, the New Zealand Court of Appeals 
noted that it would be ‗―less inclined to intervene‖ in social and economic rights because 
―complex social and economic considerations and trade-offs were involved.‖‘
75
  How 
then can courts adequately address economic, social, and cultural rights? 
The answer lies in the ―reasonable‖ approach adopted by the South African 
Constitutional Court.  The Court treats economic, social, and cultural rights much as it 
would review administrative decisions, evaluating whether government action was 
reasonable in relation to the right at issue.  This administrative approach to economic, 
social, and cultural rights maintains the balance of power among governmental branches 
because it does not dictate redressability for the actual right; rather the court can 
adjudicate only the government‘s rational pursuit of that right.  Thus, the legislative 
branch retains the power to craft any implementation of the right that it sees fit, as long as 
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it is reasonable.  If the legislative branch fails to implement the right at all or if it does so 
in an unreasonable manner, the court can force it to revisit the issue and craft a new, 
reasonable solution.  The court may decide what factors the legislative branch must 
address for the solution to be ―reasonable,‖ but it will not dictate a particular approach; 
rather, it will allow the legislative branch to construct any reasonable method for ensuring 
the implementation of the right.  This thesis will show, below, that this approach 
addresses the central concern of critics because it ensures the balance of power among 
governmental branches is preserved.  Using such a method, courts do not dictate a 
particular method or action to the legislative branch, but they do force the legislative 
branch to pursue these rights in a rational manner. 
a. The South African Experience 
The same year of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
76
 a coalition 
composed of the Reunified National Party and the Afrikaner Party of South Africa 
enacted the apartheid laws, which institutionalized a system of racial discrimination in 
South Africa.
77
  Reinforcing decades of informal racism, the 1948 government 
systematized the separation of the races in the economic, political, social, and educational 
sectors.
78
  White dominance was solidified by depriving blacks and coloureds of land, 
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education, and resources.
79
  The South African Constitutional Court noted that during 
apartheid, ―[r]ace was the basic, all-pervading and inescapable criterion for participation 
by a person in aspects of political and social life.‖
80
  Grave and systematic government–
sanctioned human rights violations would occur from 1948 until the dismantling of 
apartheid in 1994.
81
  Indeed, "apartheid was . . . chiefly a matter of . . . concrete and 
material violence and exploitation."
82
  This included detention without trial, restriction of 
movement, torture, killings, and other repressive tactics, violating both civil and political 
human rights and economic, social, and cultural human rights.
83
 
After decades of apartheid and following an interim 1994 constitution, South 
Africa adopted a new constitution in 1996.  This constitution later included several 
fundamental economic, social, and cultural rights.
84
  In arguing for the inclusion of 
economic, social, and cultural rights, the chair of the African National Congress‘ 
Constitutional Committee, Zola Skweylya, stated that ―[w]e do not want freedom without 
bread, nor do we want bread without freedom.‖
85
  Albie Sachs, later a Constitutional 
Court Justice, would also argue for a broader vision of rights, promoting the idea that 
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rights are mechanisms for ―orderly, progressive, and rapid change in the direction of real 
equality‖ rather than mere checks against government powers.
86
 
The new South African Constitution has been credited with helping build South 
Africa‘s ―rainbow nation‖
87
 (a colloquial South African expression reflecting the plurality 
of the country‘s ethnic makeup), and it was heavily influenced by the Universal 
Declaration, ICCPR, and ICESCR.
88
  The South African Constitution includes economic, 
social, and cultural rights such as the right of access to adequate housing;
89
 the right to 
have access to health care services, sufficient food and water, and social security;
90
 the 
right to a basic education;
91
 the right to use the language of one‘s choice and participate 
in the cultural life of one‘s choice;
92
 and the right to an environment which is not harmful 
to one‘s health or well-being.
93
  Many of these rights were direct responses to abuses of 
power during the apartheid era.
94
  In addition to the backward looking provisions 
designed to address apartheid-era transgressions, the Constitution also looks toward the 
future.  Labeled a ―transformative constitution,‖ Karl Klare called the South African 
Constitution ―an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent 
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political processes grounded in law.‖
95
  The South African Constitution is the result of 
―the first deliberate and calculated effort in history to craft a human rights state—a polity 
that is primarily animated by human rights norms.‖
96
   
This constitutional experiment by South Africa has created a new vision of how 
such rights can be implemented.  The South African Constitutional Court‘s decisions can 
help guide other countries in the implementation and redressability of economic, social, 
and cultural rights.  The Court‘s decisions address the lack of precedent in the area of 
redressability of social, economic, and cultural rights.  In addition, the South African 
experience provides a helpful roadmap for other countries that wish to give these rights 
real meaning in constitutional settings. 
i. The Grootboom Decision: Adjudicating Reasonableness 
Segregation of land started long before formal apartheid.  In 1913, the Native 
Land Act became law, creating territorial segregation.
97
  It created land reserves for 
blacks and prohibited the sale of land by whites to blacks who could only live outside the 
land reserves if they could prove that they were in white employment.
98
  The segregation 
policies were expanded under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, which implemented 
mechanisms for the removal of black landowners outside the reserves.
99
  In the 1950s, 
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segregation again expanded as black South Africans were subdivided ethnically and 
linguistically, and then they were placed on separate homelands.
100
  In the years that 
followed, the government practiced ―influx control‖ in urban areas, granting employment 
and housing preferences to coloureds (individuals of mixed white and black heritage) and 
excluding black people.
101
  In spite of housing freezes for blacks in the Western Cape, 
blacks continued to move into the area in search of employment, and they were forced to 
move into squatter settlements characterized by inadequate housing, overcrowding, and 
government harassment.
102
  By the time the Interim Constitution was adopted in 1994, 
there was a shortage of more than 100,000 housing units in the Cape Metro.
103
  In 
addition, hundreds of thousands of others occupied rudimentary shelters.
104
 
In 1999, Irene Grootboom and others were evicted from their "informal homes" 
on private land which had been earmarked for formal low-cost housing.
105
  Previously, 
Grootboom and others had lived in Wallacedene, one of the informal squatter settlements 
on the fringe of the Cape Metro.
106
  A quarter of Wallacedene's residents had no income, 
and more than two-thirds of the residents earned less than 500 rand per month.
107
  Half 
the individuals living in Wallacedene were children, and all individuals in Wallacedene 
lived in sub-standard housing.
108
  Wallacedene was partially flooded during seasonal 
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rains, and it had no refuse, sewage, or water services.
109
  Only five percent of 
Wallacedene‘s shacks had electricity.
110
  Grootboom and her extended family lived 
together in a shack ―about twenty metres square.‖
111
  Many individuals living in 
Wallacedene had applied for subsidized, low-cost housing, and some had been on the 
waiting list for up to seven years.
112
  Receiving no response from local authorities about 
when low-cost housing might be provided, Grootboom and others moved out of 
Wallacedene to privately owned, vacant land which was slated to be used for low-cost 
housing.
113
  They did not have the consent of the owner, and he obtained an ejectment 
order against them in municipal court; yet their former sites in Wallacedene had been 
filled by others.
114
  At the beginning of winter in 1999, much like government practices 
under apartheid, the respondents were forcibly removed, their homes were burnt and their 
possessions were destroyed.
115
  Facing winter rains, the litigants sheltered on a nearby 
sports field under plastic sheeting.
116
  Grootboom and the other litigants requested relief 
from the Cape of Good Hope High Court to provide adequate basic shelter or housing 
until they could obtain permanent housing.
117
  A settlement agreement with the 
government
118
 was reached but the government failed to comply with it.
119
  At the time of 
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the decision, the Constitutional Court noted that the case reminded it ―of the intolerable 
conditions under which many of our people are still living.‖
120
 
Grounding its decision in Section 26 of the Constitution, which provides the right 
of access to adequate housing, the Constitutional Court of South Africa found that the 
government was not meeting its constitutional obligations in regards to housing.
121
  The 
Court noted that the Constitution required the government to take positive action to 
ameliorate shelter for its citizens.
122
  It directly addressed the justiciability of economic, 
social, and cultural rights, noting that they "are expressly included in the Bill of Rights; 
they cannot be said to exist on paper only."
123
  Previously, when certifying the new 
Constitution, the Court had noted that such rights "are, at least to some extent, justiciable 
. . . . [M]any of the civil and political rights entrenched in the [constitutional text] will 
give rise to similar budgetary implications without compromising their justiciability.  The 
fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such implications does 
not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability.  At the very minimum, socio-economic 
rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion."
124
  In Grootboom, the Court 
added that "[t]he question is therefore not whether socio-economic rights are justiciable 
under our Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given case."
125
 
Taking into account the special apartheid circumstances responsible for the 
current situation, it found that economic, social, and cultural rights must be understood in 
                                                 
120
 Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. at ¶ 2. 
121
 Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. at ¶ 69. 
122
 Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. at ¶ 93. 
123
 Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. at ¶ 20. 
124
 Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. at ¶ 20. 
125
 Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. at ¶ 20. 
 36 
their social and historical contexts.
126
  Further noting the clear relationship of the right of 
access to housing with other rights and grounding the right in the "foundational values" 
of South African society, it stated that the constitutional provision required the state to 
take reasonable legislative and other measures within the state‘s available resources and 
to achieve the progressive realization of the right to access to housing.
127
  Hence, the 
government had an affirmative obligation to "give effect" to the rights enshrined in it, 
rights that could appropriately be enforced by the judicial branch.
128
 Specifically, the 
Court stated that "[t]he state is obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those 
living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing."
129
  
Although there was legislation in place, the Court found no coherent public 
housing program.
130
  The Court found that the housing program in effect was not 
"reasonable" in light of the state's obligation because it failed to give relief to a 
significant portion of the population—specifically "those desperately in need of access to 
housing"—either in the short term or the long term.
131
  The Court ordered the government 
to meet its obligations by devising, funding, implementing and supervising measures to 
provide relief to those in "desperate need."
132
  Writing for the Court, Justice Zak Yacoob 
expounded on the ―reasonableness‖ requirement of the governments duties: 
[e]ach sphere of government must accept responsibility for the implementation of 
particular parts of the programme but the national sphere of government must 
assume responsibility for ensuring that laws, policies, programmes and strategies 
are adequate to meet the state‘s section 26 obligations . . . . The measures must 
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establish a coherent public housing programme directed towards the progressive 
realisation of the right of access to adequate housing within the state‘s available 
means. The programme must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right. 
The precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily a 
matter for the legislature and the executive. They must, however, ensure that the 
measures they adopt are reasonable.  In any challenge based on section 26 in 
which it is argued that the state has failed to meet the positive obligations imposed 
upon it by section 26(2), the question will be whether the legislative and other 
measures taken by the state are reasonable. A court considering reasonableness 
will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have 
been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent. The 
question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It 
is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted 
by the state to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of 
reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is 
met.
133
 
Here, the Court retains judicial review power over legislative decisions relating to 
economic, social, and cultural rights but notes that it will only review legislative 
decisions for their reasonableness.  Although clearly deferring to the legislative branch 
regarding the particulars of implementing standards, the Court also stated that:  
[l]egislative measures by themselves are not likely to constitute constitutional 
compliance. Mere legislation is not enough. The state is obliged to act to achieve 
the intended result, and the legislative measures will invariably have to be 
supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and programmes implemented by 
the executive. These policies and programmes must be reasonable both in their 
conception and their implementation. The formulation of a programme is only the 
first stage in meeting the state‘s obligations. The programme must also be 
reasonably implemented. An otherwise reasonable programme that is not 
implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with the state‘s 
obligations.
134
 
In this particular case, the Court noted that a solution must provide for short, medium, 
and long-term needs.
135
  In effect, it noted that a reasonable solution must address each of 
these factors; failure to address each factor would make a solution unreasonable.  Thus, 
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the Court outlined specific government duties while specifying those requirements 
broadly enough to preserve the balance of power.   
In this landmark decision, the South African Constitutional Court assumed 
judicial review over economic, social, and cultural rights, giving them a means of 
redressability; and it clarified the role of the judicial branch in determining the 
government‘s duties in regard to such rights.  A court reviews whether government 
measures reasonably facilitate the progression realization of the economic, social, or 
cultural right in question.  If the court determines the measures are not reasonable, it can 
order the legislative branch to craft a new, reasonable solution.  It will not substitute its 
judgment regarding the details inherent in a particular solution, however; such decisions 
are left to the political process.  Thus, the reasonableness requirement demands certain 
government duties toward economic, social, and cultural rights, but it limits the judicial 
review of those government duties to reasonableness, thereby preserving and respecting 
the balance of power among government structures.  Legislative powers, then, are free to 
exercise a measure of political autonomy in crafting solutions, as long as they are within 
the bounds of ―reasonableness,‖ as determined by the judicial branch. 
The Constitutional Court‘s application of social, economic, and cultural rights in 
Grootboom illustrates that such rights can be justiciable while also addressing the 
fundamental concerns of those who object to their practical implementation.  Rather than 
confirming critics‘ fears that such rights are inherently non-justiciable, the South African 
Constitutional Court approached economic, social, and cultural rights in an innovative 
manner, melding traditional constitutional law with an administrative law approach based 
on the reasonability requirement.  The Constitutional Court carefully walked a tightrope 
 39 
between the enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights and observing the 
balance of powers among government branches.  This careful balance illustrates that 
courts can provide violations of economic, social, and cultural rights with remedies.  
Although those remedies may not be as strong as the remedies provided for civil and 
political rights, such an approach addresses both the concerns of critics and the 
importance of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
In addition, the Grootboom case recognized the nuances of providing remedies for 
economic, social, and cultural rights.  Even though the full enjoyment of an economic, 
social, or cultural right relies on—to some extent—the availability of resources, a weak 
application of this right still necessitates governmental duties based on the circumstances 
of the state in question and the facts of the case.  Thus, the Grootboom decision 
acknowledged that political decisions must be left up to the political branches of 
government, yet it directed the political branches to provide an adequate remedy.  
Although the judicial branch may determine certain factors that the legislative branch 
must consider for any solution to be ―reasonable,‖ the legislative branch retains the power 
to craft any reasonable solution it wishes through its political process.  This innovative 
approach provides a workable model for other countries to implement economic, social, 
and cultural rights as constitutionally protected rights. 
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ii. Further Development under the Treatment Action 
Campaign Decision 
Today, between 15 and 20 percent of adults in South Africa are currently infected 
with HIV.
136
  In 2004, South Africa had 5.3 million HIV-positive people, including 1.7 
million people who needed treatment.
137
  An additional 300,000 South African children 
had been orphaned by the AIDS pandemic. 
138
  Aarthi Belani notes that ―[i]t is no 
accident: HIV/AIDS is widespread in South Africa largely because apartheid enforced a 
migrant labor system that destabilized family life and conjugal fidelity.‖
139
  In the sixteen 
years since apartheid, the government has had to address deep system inequities—under 
apartheid, blacks did not have equal access to medical care; hospitals were segregated; 
and blacks were allocated significantly less health funding.
140
  Because health risks such 
as HIV/AIDS were not adequately addressed in the black population under apartheid, its 
effects have grown exponentially.  In 2003, the Economist noted that ―in the absence of 
AIDS, there would be modest economic growth and universal education within three 
generations.  If nothing is done to combat the epidemic, however, the model predicts a 
complete economic collapse within four generations.‖
141
  The second President of South 
Africa, Thabo Mbeki, did not help the plight against this disease.  Although an 
international consensus shows that AIDS is caused by HIV, Mbeki doubted that 
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antiretroviral drugs were effective in treating the disease and emphasized their toxicity.
142
  
Denials by leading African National Congress leaders such as Mbeki have ―undoubtedly 
delayed and frustrated an effective response to the pandemic there.‖
143
 
In the Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, colloquially known as 
―TAC,‖ the Constitutional Court of South Africa reviewed a ruling by the High Court of 
Pretoria finding that the government had acted unreasonably in (1) refusing to make 
nevirapine (an antiretroviral drug used for HIV/AIDS treatment) accessible to the public 
where medically indicated and (2) in not setting a national program timeframe to prevent 
mother-to-child transmissions of HIV.
144
  The Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
government had not fulfilled its constitutional mandate to "take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation" of 
the "right to access" to "health care services."
145
 
Prior to the TAC litigation, the government had created a strategic five-year plan 
to deal with mother-to-child transmission, using the drug nevirapine.
146
  Nevirapine had 
been deemed safe and was recommended to mothers and newborn children to combat 
HIV by several organizations, including the World Health Organization.
147
  The South 
African government made nevirapine available at a limited number of pilot sites (two per 
province); although the manufacturer had offered to make it available for free to the 
South African government for five years to reduce mother-to-child transmission of 
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HIV.
148
  Because it was not made available elsewhere, doctors in the public sector who 
were not located at one of the pilot sites could not prescribe it for their patients.
149
 
Treatment Action Campaign and others filed suit against the government, 
claiming that the government had failed to fulfill its obligations under the Constitution in 
relation to providing health care services for HIV-positive mothers and their newborn 
babies.
150
  They argued that the government failed its constitutional mandate by 
prohibiting the administration of nevirapine at public sites other than the pilot sites.
151
 
Further, they argued, the government violated its constitutional duties by failing to 
implement a comprehensive program for the prevention of mother-to-child HIV.
152
  
The Court found that the policy confining the supply of nevirapine was not 
reasonable under the circumstances, rejecting the government‘s arguments about safety, 
efficacy, and resistance.
153
  Nevirapine was being provided to the government for free, so 
cost was not a factor.
154
  The Court found that the South African government had already 
determined the drug was safe.
155
  The government's policy being challenged even 
prohibited facilities with the requisite testing and counseling capacities from 
administering the drug.
156
  Administration of the drug was "simple," and its 
administration was a potentially lifesaving intervention in the life of a young child.
157
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Thus, the Court found the children's needs were "most urgent" and their rights were 
"most in peril" as a result of the government's policy.
158
 
The Court reasoned that after the decision not to make nevirapine available at 
other hospitals and clinics was reversed, the government "will be able to devise and 
implement a more comprehensive policy that will give access to health care services to 
HIV-positive mothers and their newborn children, and will include the administration of 
nevirapine where it is appropriate."
159
  However, the Court noted, "[t]hat does not mean 
that everyone can immediately claim access to such treatment . . . . Every effort must, 
however, be made to do so as soon as reasonably possible."
160
 
The Court rejected the government's claim that adjudication of the issue would 
violate the separation of powers.
161
  Notably, the government did not raise the issue of 
justiciability, although it did cite potential balance of power violations if the court did not 
show deference to the executive "concerning the formulation of its policies" or by issuing 
an order which found that the executive failed to comply with its constitutional 
obligations.
162
  The Court rejected a government argument that the separation of powers 
precluded an order other than a declaration of rights because any other order would "have 
the effect of requiring the executive to pursue a particular policy."
163
  The Court pointed 
out that there are "certain matters that are pre-eminently within the domain of one or 
other of the arms of government and not the others," and that "[a]ll arms of government 
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should be sensitive to and respect this separation."
164
  However, it found that "[t]his does 
not mean . . . that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an impact on 
policy."
165
  Because the South African Constitution requires the government to "respect, 
protect, promote, and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights," courts that find state policies 
which are inconsistent with the Constitution must ensure "appropriate relief is afforded to 
those who have suffered infringement of their constitutional rights."
166
  "In so far as that 
constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the executive, that is an intrusion mandated by 
the Constitution itself."
167
  The Court stated it would take into account the nature of the 
right infringed and the nature of the infringement in crafting a judicial remedy, and 
remedies could include supervisory jurisdiction.
168
  The Court noted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had used a structural injunction to address educational equality issues in 
the landmark decisions Brown v. Board of Education.
169
  Hence, the Court would apply 
remedies that it deemed proper under the circumstances. 
The Court, nevertheless, declined to create a justiciable private right for citizens 
apart from the reasonableness limitation on the government.
170
  This differentiation 
allowed the Court to remedy governmental action based on a reasonableness standard but 
limited the Court‘s ability to remedy violations specific to particular individuals.  In its 
opinion, the Court noted that "courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-
ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum-core 
                                                 
164
 Minister of Health, ¶ 98. 
165
 Minister of Health, ¶ 98. 
166
 Minister of Health, ¶¶ 99, 103. 
167
 Minister of Health, ¶ 99. 
168
 Minister of Health, ¶106. 
169
 Minister of Health, ¶ 107. 
170
 Minister of Health, ¶ 39. 
 45 
standards . . . should be, nor for deciding how public revenues should most effectively 
spent."
171
  The Court further stated: 
[c]ourts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have 
multiple social and economic consequences for the community.  The Constitution 
contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, namely to require 
the state to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the 
reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.  Such determinations of 
reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves 
directed at rearranging budgets.  In this way the judicial, legislative, and executive 
functions achieve appropriate balance.
172
 
It stressed that the Constitution did not "expect more of the State than is achievable 
within its available resources."
173
  Hence, the "corresponding rights themselves are 
limited by reason of the lack of resources."
174
 
The Court found that the overarching policy of the government had failed; thus 
because of the pressing need to ensure the prevention of the loss of life and because of 
the circumstances surrounding the nevirapine disagreement, the Court ordered the 
government to devise a "comprehensive and co-ordinated programme" to progressively 
realize the rights of pregnant women and newborn children to have access to health 
services.
175
  It ordered specific relief, requiring the government to remove restrictions that 
prevented nevirapine from being made available at hospitals and clinics not included in 
the pilot program, to permit and facilitate the use of nevirapine to reduce mother-to-child 
transmissions of HIV where medically indicated, to make provision for nevirapine 
counselors at other locations, and to take reasonable measures to extend the testing and 
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counseling facilities at other sites.
176
  In doing so, it noted that its orders did "not preclude 
[the] government from adapting its policy in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution."
177
 
In this decision, the Court used the Grootboom framework of reasonableness, but 
developed its jurisprudence to encompass important national policy decisions, where 
those policy decisions violated the South African Constitution‘s Bill of Rights.  Even in 
the midst of this revolutionary economic, social, and cultural human rights jurisprudence, 
however, the Court crafted a narrow role for itself—to maintain the proper balance of 
power among governmental spheres.  Far from overstepping its judicial bounds, the 
South African Constitutional Court has paved a new vision of the Court‘s role in 
adjudicating economic, social, and cultural rights. 
iii. The Effect of South African Jurisprudence in the Area of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
Both the Grootboom and the TAC decisions show that nations can develop new 
modes of addressing economic, social, and cultural rights.  Such modes recognize that 
true protection requires enforcement and redressability, although the type of protection 
may vary based on the nature of the right at issue.   
Furthermore, South African jurisprudence has shown that its courts properly 
respect the governmental balance of powers.  While enabling enforcement of economic, 
social, and cultural rights, the South African Constitutional Court maintained a 
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conservative judicial role.
178
  Because of the balance of powers concern inherent in 
adjudicating economic, social, and cultural rights, this approach has been entirely proper.  
Indeed, Cass Sunstein described the South African Constitutional Court‘s decisions as 
―restrained,‖ ―respectful,‖ and ―deferential‖ to the state and legislative branch.
179
  The 
Court has not endorsed the view that the judicial branch can or will review budgeting 
decisions regarding social, economic, and cultural rights; although some decisions may 
have budgetary implications.
180
  It has restrained itself from infringing upon the proper 
sphere of legislative and executive powers, yet it retains its proper role in reviewing 
decisions for their constitutionality.  As Mark Kende notes, ―[t]he striking feature in these 
cases is the Court‘s pragmatic balancing of its transformative role and separation of 
powers concerns.‖
181
  By using a reasonability standard, the Court shields itself from 
political decisions, thereby preserving the balance of powers. 
In effect, through the reasonableness requirement, the Court has given meaning to 
economic, social, and cultural rights by providing citizens with positive albeit somewhat 
weak claims against the government.
182
  These claims are weaker than some positive 
rights because they require courts to review only the reasonableness of the government‘s 
efforts to address such rights, much like an administrative decision, rather than providing 
direct relief.  Stronger positive rights are rights that demand specific state behaviors.  
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Weaker positive rights ―do not support a right to [that thing] per se, but a right to 
reasonable state measures that make [that thing] progressively available and accessible . . 
. . The core value achieved through the formulation is a process one: government must be 
deliberative and rational.  It must formulate considered and appropriate response to the 
social and welfare needs of its people.‖
183
   
Using the reasonability approach, the South African Constitutional Court has 
assumed review powers over government efforts to implement economic, social, and 
cultural rights.  This method allows political branches a large amount of autonomy to 
craft particular solutions, as long as any particular solution is ―reasonable,‖ as determined 
by the judicial branch.  This approach effectively responds to concerns about the role of 
the judiciary in adjudicating such rights; but it also provides a method of redressability 
for economic, social, and cultural rights, properly safeguarding them as justiciable 
constitutional rights for citizens. 
iv. Understanding Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 
Context 
In the South African context, the Constitutional Court determined that 
government efforts to fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights must be ―reasonable.‖  
If other countries adopt the South African approach, they might wonder how 
―reasonable‖ should be interpreted by judicial officers, politicians, and others because 
applying a reasonability standard only works if there is a general consensus about what it 
means.  How should its definition be interpreted in other socio-historical communities 
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when the underlying moral justification for these rights is based on a pragmatic 
agreement (the Universal Declaration) rather than substantive moral content?  In 
particular, how can political judgments be divorced from judicial determinations of 
reasonability?   
There are a number of ways ―reasonable‖ can be understood.  Because the 
underlying moral justification may vary from community to community, there may well 
be different approaches to the determination of reasonability and, more generally, the role 
of these rights in a particular society.  The particular determination of the role of 
economic, social, and cultural rights will rely, to a large extent, on particular socio-
historical conditions.  In South Africa, for instance, many of the country‘s conditions are 
a direct result of government and private abuses of power during apartheid.  The 
application of economic, social, and cultural rights in the South African context is an 
attempt to correct those abuses and re-distribute power equally across South African 
society.  Other countries may be dealing with very different socio-historical 
circumstances; therefore, their understanding of the role of economic, social, and cultural 
rights may also be different.  Certainly, the application of these rights across societies 
should reflect their particular socio-historical circumstances, whether it is correcting 
institutionalized power imbalances or latent social, cultural, and economic inequities.   
Philosophers can and should help clarify the role of economic, social, and cultural 
rights within communities, and some of this work has already begun.  For instance, 
Martha Nussbaum argues that individuals need a minimum threshold of human 
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capabilities.
 184
  These capabilities provide an essential basis for realizing one‘s 
humanness, including bodily health, bodily integrity, emotions, practical reason, and 
social interaction, among others.
185
  Hence, it becomes incumbent upon the state to 
ensure the fulfillment of these basic capabilities. Under this approach, economic, social, 
and cultural rights are important because they help contributes to the protection and 
development of Nussbaum‘s conception of human ―capabilities,‖ which leads to human 
flourishing (ευδαιμονία).  In this instance, then, such rights functionally ensure the 
actualization of a minimum threshold for human capabilities across a society. 
There are also other possible approaches to understanding the role of such rights, 
and philosophers should continue to help address the role these rights play.  Without a 
basic understanding of how these rights function within a community, a judicial decision 
could be reduced to a political decision.  Fortunately, judges are themselves products of 
their socio-historical circumstances; as such, they reflect their communities‘ ideals and 
values.  However, a deeper understanding of the role of these rights is crucial to their 
equitable applicability across a nation, and thus, this area of philosophical understanding 
is crucial for the long-term success of economic, social, and cultural rights.  Such 
understandings of rights can be pragmatically useful to courts as they interpret these 
rights in their socio-historical contexts, and philosophers should continue to develop 
understanding in this area. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Economic, social, and cultural rights have suffered for decades as the ―poor 
relations‖
186
 in the international human rights family.  Although people, governments, 
and entities generally recognize that economic, social, and cultural rights are important, 
their potential as rights has not been actualized.  In the modern age, governments have 
looked to historical precedent when forming the boundaries of their constitutional social 
compacts, and this has limited the content of constitutions to the protection of civil and 
political rights.  Constitutions generally have not recognized economic, social, and 
cultural rights until now because of their unique nature as rights that often require 
significant resource allocation and corresponding concerns about their role in liberal 
political systems.  The South African example has dramatically illustrated that such rights 
can be constitutionalized without upsetting a government‘s balance of power, and it has 
provided a preliminary roadmap for other countries to follow.  Using a visionary 
constitution, the South African example provides clear insights into how countries can 
institute such rights as constitutionally protected principles, giving them real, cognizable 
value for everyday citizens. 
However, the South African experience is only one model for the practical 
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights.  It is based on the current 
implementation structure of civil and political rights in many western constitutions.  
Certainly, there are other possibilities for the implementation of economic, social, and 
cultural rights that may better fit the unique nature of such rights or the particular ethno-
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historical context of a country while also preserving the redressability of such rights for 
citizens.  Under the South African model, for instance, a grievance generally must be 
widespread before a court can act (otherwise, a plaintiff would be unable to prove that the 
government‘s action were unreasonable).  This approach to economic, social, and cultural 
rights allows people a means of redressability, but it is a very limited redressability.  
Thus, in the South African context, isolated economic, social, and cultural rights 
violations may not have a remedy.  Furthermore, under the South African model, there is 
little redress if the political branch ignores the judicial branches‘ opinion in an economic, 
social, and cultural rights case.  Such an approach relies on each branch respecting its 
sphere of power, but likewise, this approach breaks down if any government branch 
disregards its proper boundaries of power or ignores its proper functional role.  While the 
South African model illustrates a possible treatment of economic, social, and cultural 
rights, it is not the only approach.  Philosophers, politicians, activists, concerned citizens, 
constitution-writers, and others should not neglect other possibilities that will also help 
realize economic, social, and cultural rights—possibly even more effectively than the 
South African model.  In the future, other models, both constitutional treatments of rights 
and non-constitutional treatments, should be evaluated for their effectiveness, including 
looking at the traditions of other nation-states and civil societies. 
In addition, this thesis has not addressed an inherent tension between civil and 
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights.  The separation of political and 
civil rights from economic, social, and cultural rights is largely a historical construct: 
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The right to work, for example, is a right to economic participation that is 
instrumentally and intrinsically valuable in ways very much like the right to 
political participation.  Cultural rights are perhaps most closely related to 
individual civil liberties, given the integral place of religion, public speech, and 
mass media in the cultural life of most communities.  The social or cultural right 
to education is intimately connected with the civil or political right to freedom of 
speech, belief, and opinion, and so forth.
187
 
While there are many similarities between the two types of rights and while they are 
often interrelated and interdependent, they may also conflict.  For example, while most 
cultural practices are healthy celebrations of culture, there are also troubling situations 
concerning some cultural practices.  Cultural practices are meant to bind a community 
together, but in some situations, such as female genital mutilation, group identity is 
constructed at the expense of a population‘s least politically, socially, or economically 
powerful members.  Those practicing female genital mutilation claim that it is an 
expression of their cultural right, yet individual civil and political rights to bodily 
integrity are in direct conflict with this cultural right.
188
  Philosophers and others should 
continue to consider the unique challenges presented by all of these rights, including 
when and how they should be properly protected.
189
 
Although this thesis has shown that economic, social, and cultural rights can be 
judicially cognizable as constitutional provisions, truly securing such rights in any society 
requires a much broader approach.  The law is only the ―tip of a social iceberg.‖
190
  Legal 
effectiveness and redressability depend both upon the law‘s formal provisions and 
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complex social relations.
191
  Certainly any right may be frustrated by cultural practices.
192
  
However, justiciability should  no longer be considered as a persuasive reason not to 
include economic, social, and cultural rights in constitutions.  Although the enforcement 
mechanism for these rights may differ from that of civil and political rights, it is no less 
valid; nor should these rights continue to be treated as second-class rights. 
 Memorializing rights in constitutions is one way to give economic, social, and 
cultural rights practical meaning for citizens.  A transformative constitution and visionary 
justices in South Africa have taken a long leap forward toward realizing these important 
rights, and now is the time for other liberal democracies to contemplate how they can 
actualize these rights for their citizens in the twenty-first century. 
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